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INTRODUCTION

States will have substantial flexibility in designing their health
plans under proposed Congressional Medicaid revisions: income
limits are raised, benefits can be revised and mandated oversight is
reduced. This flexibility creates an opportunity to redesign health
care systems for low-income families.1
Understanding how the current Medicaid Health
Maintainance Organization (HMO) system functions is essential to
system redesign. The ability of Medicaid HMOs to provide quality
health care to low-income families depends on an intricate and
complex system of consumer protection and community participation institutions and mechanisms. These protection and participation elements developed in conjunction with the switch to
managed care by state Medicaid programs.2 State Medicaid managed care programs are moving towards similar systems for protection and participation as states share information and successes.3
Dubbed the "social HMO for low-income families," this model
for protection and participation is based on observations of Wisconsin's HMO Medicaid program and examination of documents
from other states.4 The phrase also resonates with the "social
1 Diane Duston, Governors Grilled on Weyare Reform, Wis. ST.J., Feb. 23, 1996, at 3A.
Wisconsin, for example, enacted legislation expanding Medicaid to cover low-income
families by placing them in a managed care pool financed with Medicaid dollars and
administered by the existing Medicaid administrators. If their employers offer a
health care plan and pay 50% of the cost, the families no longer would be eligible for
the State plan. See 1995 Wis. Act 289 [hereinafter 1995 Act].
2 There is an Aid to Families with Dependent Children program (AFDC) aspect
of the Medicaid program. A large percentage of women and children now receive
health care coverage through Medicaid HMOs. A Federal waiver system allows state
Medicaid programs to enroll recipients in HMOs. See Vernallia Randall, Section 1115
Medicaid Waivers: Critiquingthe State Applications, 26 SETON HALL L. REv. 1069 (1996).
This Article only discusses the HMO risk contract programs, where the HMO is responsible for providing a comprehensive set of health care services. The state pays
the HMO a monthly capitation or premium to provide health care. MnimAAN & RoBERTSON, INC., UNDERSTANDING MEDICAID 12 (undated). This Article does not distinguish between HMO types that provide risk contract services. I have not observed
significant variation on the points that I discuss.
3 The Wisconsin administrators circulated HMO contracts from other states to
HMOs and community groups when they expanded to statewide HMO enrollment.
California legislators are considering emulating the Wisconsin financial recoupment
system to encourage preventive care. See Tom Philip, New Way to Access Care Plan,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Dec. 4, 1995, at B8.
4 For a description of the historical development of the Milwaukee Medicaid Social HMO system, see generally Louise G. Trubek, Making Managed Competition a Social
Arena: StrategiesForAction, 60 BRooK. L. REv. 275 (1994). The author is a member of
the Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services statewide committee to advise on expansion to the entire state. The committee has examined state HMO con-
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HMO for frail elderly," a decade-old model for integrated acute
and long-term care. 5 The model contributes to evaluation of how
consumer and community participation assist in overcoming barriers to HMO quality health care for low-income families. It is important, however, to understand the model as an ideal because no
program effectively provides all elements. It takes time and energy
to maintain the key aspects and imagination to implement the entire vision.6
Health care systems in the workplace are also demonstrating
aspects of the social HMO model. Public and private organizations
are incorporating consumer protections and community dimensions into proposed state regulations and private certification. Integrating these elements enables state agencies, legislators, HMOs,
employers, and community and client groups to design effective
health care systems for working families.
First, this Article examines the Medicaid social HMO model
and analyzes its key elements. Next, the Article discusses the emergence in workplace health systems of proposed consumer protection and analyzes these proposals. The Article concludes with
proposals for health care coverage for low-income families that include consumer protection and community participation.
II.
A.

THE SOCIAL MEDICAID

HMO

Barriers to Quality Managed Care for Low-Income Families

Commentators expressed concerns about the ability of HMOs
to serve low-income families.7 Specifically, their concerns involved
the general limitations of HMO service for all consumers and the
special needs of low-income families. For all families, though,
managed care consistently demonstrated two problems: under-utilization of services and unusable consumer information. In terms
of service, prepaid plans deliver relatively comprehensive health
care to an enrolled population.' Supplying a fixed set of services
tracts from Massachusetts, Arizona, Missouri, Ohio, and Minnesota. See WISCONSIN
BUREAU OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING, PROCUREMENT AND CONTRACT WORKGROUP, UP-

DATE FOR SWAG (May 25, 1995).
5 Long-Term Care Lessons From the Social HMOs and PACE Models, 3 DrvERsrr AND
LONG-TERM CARE NEws 1, 3 (Brandeis Univ., Institute for Health Policy/San Diego

State Univ. Ctr. on Aging, 1996) [hereinafter Long-Term Care Lessors].
6 See id. at 3 (discussing the struggle to achieve the social HMO for the frail
elderly).
7 See generally Rand E. Rosenblatt, Health Care, Markets and Democratic Values, 34
VAND. L. REv. 1067 (1981).
8 Id. at 1076.
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for a predetermined amount, HMOs had an incentive to provide as
little service as possible in order to retain a profitable amount of
the capitation fee. By creating obstacles, such as elaborate referral
systems for specialists, limits on chronic care services, and long
waits for service, HMOs were able to limit provision of services.
The HMO model also depended on providing consumers usable information at the right time.9 The "informed consumer" is
necessary at two points. First, when consumers choose among competing HMOs, they must have good information on quality, access
and cost. Second, when seeking health care within an HMO, they
must know how to find the primary care doctor, how to request a
referral to a specialist, and how to complain when they are dissatisfied.' 0 At neither point had usable information been forthcoming.
HMOs had no incentive to collect or disseminate the data, and
consumers did not have the resources to gather the information.
For low-income families, there were additional barriers in the
HMO system: lack of easy access to health care, cultural insensitivity of providers, and obstacles to the use of specialized providers.
Low-income families are often concentrated in central city areas or
other neighborhoods which may have few health care providers,"
and some rural areas have a large percentage of low-income families and a limited number of providers. Inadequate transportation
may also restrict the ability of low-income families to efficiently
reach health services. HMOs may require the use of cost-efficient
mass processing systems. Local access may be foregone, resulting
12
in long trips for service and delays in receiving treatment.
Low-income families' health care needs are complex; different
languages and cultures may block the ability of HMOs to provide
9 Id. at 1077; see also Alain C. Enthoven, The History and Principlesof Managed Competition, 12 HEALTH Air. 24, 29 (Supp. 1993) (borrowing concepts of competition
from theories of microeconomics).
10 See generally Alan Hillman et al., Safeguarding Quality in Managed Competition, 12
HEALTH Arr. 116 (Supp. 1993); Rand E. Rosenblatt, Medicaid Primary Care Case Management, The Doctor-PatientRelationship, and the Politics of Privatization,36 CASE W. RES.

L. REv. 915, 919 (1986).

11 Louise G. Trubek & Elizabeth A. Hoffman, Searchingfor a Balance in Universal
Health CareReform, 43 DEPAuL L. REv. 1081, 1098-99 (1994); see also Note, The Impact of
Managed Careon Doctors Who Serve Poor and Minority Patients, 108 HARv. L. REv. 1625,
1634-35 (1995).
12 MniLMAN & ROBERTSON, INC., supra note 2, at 12; see also generally Roberta Riportella-Muller et al., Barriersto the Use of Preventive Health Care in the EPSTD Program: A
Survey of Users and Nonusers, 3 PUB. HEALTH REP. 71-77 (1996) (identifying barriers to
care resulting in only 1/3 of eligible children in the United States receiving Medicaid
checkups and discussing improving access to care).
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appropriate care.' To insure cost-efficient delivery, HMOs may refuse to hire translators, conduct outreach, or require sensitivity
training for providers.
Specialized providers are now an integral aspect of health care
delivery, providing quality care for pregnancy, childhood diseases,
alcoholism, drug abuse and mental illness. Using nontraditional
methods, these providers deliver successful treatment." HMOs
may seek, however, to maximize cost-efficiency by limiting their
provider pool. HMOs are under revenue pressure and a small
number of providers may be easier to control and monitor. Therefore, HMOs may not include specialized providers in their networks, preferring to use a small number of mass processing
providers instead.
B.

Overcoming the Barriers

Medicaid managed care programs have demonstrated the ability to overcome these barriers. Providers, government administrators, and community groups have developed an intricate system of
institutions and mechanisms. These innovations have created a
process that continually seeks to overcome the barriers to quality
health care for low-income families.
Medicaid social HMOs are providing protections. Their ability
to provide quality health care for low-income families is based on
three elements: client voice, administrative oversight, and community participation. Each element contains a set of institutions and
mechanisms. The intricacy and complexity of this framework is essential to success.
1. Client Voice' 5
a.

The Complaint: Individual and Group

Complaint systems provide clients with a legitimate method to
appeal denial of service, dispute unsatisfactory treatment, and
question bureaucratic interpretations. These systems are also feedTrubek & Hoffmann, supra note 11, at 1091-94.
These providers are described as "Essential Community Providers" in the Clinton Health Security Act. Id. at 1098-99; Note, supra note 11.
15 The importance of client voice is seen both in conceptualizing justice and in
economic analysis. Voice is defined as the amount of access to or input into all stages
of the decision making process as indicated in ethical decision making. See Mark R.
Fondacaro, Toward a Synthesis of Law and Social Science: Due Process and ProceduralJustice
in the Context of National Health Care Reform, 72 DEN. U.L. REv. 303, n.174 (1995). For
an economic analysis of the importance of client voice, see Mark A. Rodwin, Protecting
the Consumerin Managed Care: What Are The Issues, 26 SETON HALL L. Rv. 1007 (1996).
13
14
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back mechanisms, providing HMOs and government regulators
with information about client dissatisfaction and alerting them to
systemic problems. For example, the information can alert HMOs
to a lack of adequate referral procedures or identify a chronic lack
of mental health treatment services.
There are three different complaint systems in the HMO programs: grievance procedures, advocate positions, and ombudsman
programs. 16 Grievance procedures within HMOs are required
under the Medicaid regulations and the state contract for HMO
services.17 Some programs actively assist clients in using the grievance procedures. 18 In such programs, grievances must be reported to the regulator and are part of the quality assurance
system. 19
The advocate is an officer within each HMO required by the
state HMO contract specifications. The advocate's role is to provide client outreach and education in order to reduce the number
of grievances." The advocate also maintains community connections and resolves issues through collaborative initiatives.2 1
Ombudsman programs provide a person to whom or site
where clients can voice dissatisfaction. These programs can be located in a government office or in nonprofits. Funding can be provided by Medicaid dollars or by private or public agencies. Two
models exist in Wisconsin. Several nonprofit organizations receive
grants from Milwaukee County to serve as ombudsmen on behalf
of Milwaukee HMO Medicaid clients. These nonprofits advocate
with HMOs, supply recipient and provider education, and influence policy decisions.2 2 The 1996 Wisconsin Medicaid program
16 This is a short review of a complex issue. Many HMOs and state agencies use
different names for the same function.

17 Susan J. Stayn, Note, Securing Access to Care in Health Maintenance Organization:
Towards a Uni[orm Model of Grievance and Appeal PTrocedures, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1674,
1702-04 (1994); see also DEP'T. OF HEALTH & Soc. SERVS., HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATION (HMO) CERTIFICATION REVIEW SECTION 11 (Mar. 1, 1996- Aug. 30, 1996)
[hereinafter CERTIFICATION REVIEW SECION].
18 Wisconsin has just required the enrollment contractor to assist clients in filing
grievances with the HMOs. See STATE OF WISCONSIN, DEP'T OF HEALTH AND SOC. SERV.,
STATEWIDE ADVOCACY-MEDICAID MANAGED CARE PROGRAMS 75-76 (Feb. 8, 1996) [hereinafter MEDICAID MANAGED CARE].
19 CERTIFICATION REVIEW SECTION, supra note 17, at 11.
20 The HMO advocate position is a Wisconsin initiative. Id. at 12.
21 One example of an HMO advocate response to enrollee dissatisfaction is a program called "Dental Days." This project cooperated with the Head Start Program to

deal with the underutilization of dental care by recipients. The HMOs and Head
Start developed an improved dental appointment system which has been highly successful. Trubek, supra note 4, at 285.
22 See HEALTHWATCH, AN ADVOCACY COALITION FOR MEDICAID HMO ENROLLEES
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creates an HMO ombudsman funded and housed within the Medicaid fiscal agent.2" The functions of the statewide program will include assisting clients and facilitating working relations with the
HMO advocates, community organizations, and state agency
representatives.
b.

ConsumerInformation and CentralizedEnrollment

Consumers express their voices both when they select an
HMO and when they seek services within an HMO; to do so, they
must have adequate information. To select an appropriate HMO,
consumers must know the type of provider and accessibility of the
services. They need lists of providers who have contracts with the
HMOs and they need to know the availability of transportation to
services. 24 Once enrolled in an HMO, they must have certain
knowledge to express needs and concerns: examples of crucial information are referral system procedures and preventive care
availability.
A centralized enrollment system is a mechanism for providing
consumers with essential information. Several states employ enrollment contractors who assist the client in choosing an HMO by providing useful and accessible information.2 5 Special attention to
language difficulties and appropriate outreach is required. An enrollment system can allow the client to effectively participate in
choosing health care providers. The information is coordinated
and provided during the enrollment period when the client
chooses the HMO. The enrollment contractor can also provide
assistance to the client within the HMO. Wisconsin, for example,
requires the contractor to assist the client when filing a grievance.
A well-run system should coordinate eligibility for Medicaid with
HMO selection and enrollment to avoid delay in accessing care.2 6
(informing, in flyer form, of monthly HealthWatch meetings open to any member or
interested party).
23 See MEDICAID MANAGED CARE PROGRAMS, supra note 18, at 75-76.
24

Div.

OF MEDICAL ASSISTANCE, HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATION PROGRAM,

EXECUTIvE OFFICE OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, REQUEST FOR PROPOSALS 2 (August 5, 1994) [hereinafter MASSACHUSETTS REQUEST FOR PROPOSALS].
25 See generally Div. OF HEALTH, BUREAU OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING, DEP'T OF
HEALTH AND SOC. SERVS., STATE OF WISCONSIN, REQUEST FOR PROPOSALS FOR THE MANAGED CARE ENROLLMENT AND EDUCATION SPECIALIST (Dec. 15, 1995); MASSACHUSETTS
REQUEST FOR PROPOSALS, supra note 24.

26 Massachusetts' system has streamlined the enrollment process so that the Medicaid recipient can participate immediately in the HMO. See MASSACHUSETTS REQUEST
FOR PROPOSALS, supra note 24. Continued attention to this issue should be noted. A
Wisconsin HMO administrator recently commented that first trimester prenatal care
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The enrollment contractor is the crucial means of assembling
and providing information and facilitating client voice. The specifications for the contractor should require cultural sensitivity, language capability, and knowledge of community agencies. Funding
must also be sufficient. Insufficient assistance undermines client
voice.
2.

Administrative Oversight

a.

Quality Assurance

Quality assurance refers to techniques to monitor the quality
of care that HMOs provide.2 7 The state Medicaid agencies use
three mechanisms: internal quality assurance systems, client-based
indicators, and the HEDIS national standards. Medicaid HMOs
must include internal quality assurance systems, such as data collection systems, in order to bid for Medicaid clients. The state agency
uses the HMO data to document problems. In Wisconsin, for example, the state analyzed data and compared HMOs and fee-forservice in use of primary and specialty physicians, childhood immunization, adverse reactions to drug therapy, and Caesarian section
deliveries. Wisconsin has used the data to defend managed care
and to improve service to clients.2 8
Data collection can also incorporate client voice. Studies of
client disenrollment rates and satisfaction surveys can be implemented by the Medicaid agency to obtain information on HMO
performance. Client groups have used the quality assurance system as an advocacy technique, proposing HMO data collection and
analysis in areas where they suspect poor client service.'
The HEDIS Medicaid national standard is a complex and
lengthy document which state Medicaid directors are developing
in conjunction with the National Committee for Quality Assurance
(NCQA). This document may provide uniform standards for
for women lags in Medicaid HMOs, possibly because women must first qualify for
assistance before joining an HMO. The delay may mean that women are in the second trimester before they are enrolled. See FederalMedicaid Cuts "No Problem"for Wsconsin Recipients, 2 WISCONSIN HEALTH POLICY REPORT, Nov. 13, 1995, at 1.
27 See Michele Melden & Lorna Hennington, Quality Assurance in Medicaid Managed
Care, CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 1450, 1451 (Mar. 1993).
28 See Kevin B. Piper & Peggy Bartels, Medicaid PrimaryCare: HMOs or Fee-for-Servic
PUB. WELFtR 18 (Spring 1995) (finding that HMOs are more effective than fee-forservice in primary and preventative health care).
29 See generallyWISCONSIN DEP'T OF HEALTH AND SOC. SERVS., WISCONSIN MEDICAID
MANAGED CARE EXPANSION, SUMMARY OF CONTRACT/CERTIFICATION RECOMMENDATIONS
(1996) [hereinafter WISCONSIN SUMMARY]; see also generally Trubek, supra note 4.
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HMO internal systems requirements throughout the nation."0 The
NCQA specifies that the "set of measures includes new quality and
access measures to respond more directly to the needs of women
and children, who make up the majority of Medicaid managed
care enrollees,
and to address historical concerns related to access
31
care."
to
Incorporated into an active process, quality assurance systems
are crucial. Client and community groups use the data to document their complaints.3 Medicaid agencies use the data to trigger
enforcement mechanisms such as contract requirements and financial incentives.
b.

The ContractingProcess

Administrative control over Medicaid HMO providers is exercised through a contract model."3 Most aspects of the program are
addressed through a bidding process and subsequent individual
contracts with HMOs. The request for bids is regulated by federal
and state requirements, as well as specifications on organizational,
financial, access, and quality issues. Regular review of problems in
the system is facilitated by yearly rewriting of the bids and contract
negotiations. Health care activists and providers can submit proposed changes in the bid requirements to the administrators, documenting, for example, inadequate alcohol and drug abuse
treatment or lack of primary care providers. Administrators can
impose requirements to address concerns about access, quality,
and cultural sensitivity.'M
Wisconsin, for example, is expanding the Medicaid HMO program to the entire state. During the request period for contract
See, e.g., NATIONAL CoMMTrrrEE FOR QuALrrY ASSURANCE (NCQA), DRAFr, MEDIHEDIS viii (July 1995) (offering an adaptation of the Health Plan Employer Data
and Information Set (HEDIS) to promote standardizaton and to provide state Medicaid agencies with performance information, assistance in quality improvement, and
information for beneficiaries).
31 Letter from Patricia MacTaggert, Chairperson, Medicaid HEDIS Work Group,
and Ann Page, Director, Medicaid HEDIS Project, NCQA, to the general readership
audience for review and comment 1 (July 6, 1995) (on file with the author).
32 See supra notes 15-26 and accompanying text (discussing client voice).
33 In the fee-for-service system, control over the Medicaid program is carried out
through administrative agency rulemaking which can require legislative review and
mandatory input from the public.
34 For example, Wisconsin administrators solicited suggestions for changes in the
system from community groups, HMOs, and providers. The administrators sought to
implement suggested changes through contract requirements and responded in writing to each of the recommendations submitted. See generally WISCONSIN SUMMARY,
supra note 29.
30
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revisions, extensive suggestions were submitted in the area of rural
access. As a result, the present contract now includes a specific
section on rural health clinics, and the State is issuing an access
standard to be used for rural HMOs. 5
The contract is the basic document regulating the HMO-state
relationship and forms the basis for certification and the ability to
enroll clients and receive the capitation payment. The contract requirement allows a state to hold HMOs to a certain level of quality.
If the capitation rate is sufficient, HMOs are willing to abide by the
standards.
c.

FinancialIncentives

Financial incentives such as reinsurance, risk-sharing, and recoupment can encourage Medicaid contract participation by
HMOs. The state may offer reinsurance coverage to encourage
HMOs to submit bids without fear of insolvency. Specific risk-sharing for certain types of diseases and procedures that are costly can
also encourage hesitant HMOs to bid. Wisconsin, for example,
provides special reimbursement for neo-natal intensive care, AIDS
patients, and ventilator-dependent patients.'
Recoupment is another means of insuring quality care. States
can reduce capitation payments if the requirements of the contract
are not met. In Wisconsin, failure to provide sufficient preventive
care will result in recoupment. HMOs have been very responsive
to this incentive. HMO outreach programs have increased, enabling many children to obtain preventive care. 7
3.

Community Participation

a.

Resource Integration

An unexpected result of the shift to managed care is the development of a positive connection between HMOs and community
institutions. Integration of social services, educational institutions,
35 See id. at 41-45.

See MIIMAN & ROBERTSON, INC., supra note 2; see also 1995 Contract for Medicaid HMO Services Between HMO and Wisconsin Department of Health and Social
Services 30-33.
37 Id. at 97 (providing a HealthCheck Recoupment Worksheet which tracks the
number of eligible enrollees with the expected number of services by age group and
then compares the actual number of services provided to determine the recoupment
amount). California is struggling with administrative oversight of its newly implemented Medicaid HMO program. A recent article discussed the preferability of financial recoupment systems for guaranteeing HMO patients receipt of preventative
care. See Philip, supra note 3, at B8.
36
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and public health agencies into the HMO health care network is
notable. Providing broad services for low-income families as part
of the HMO package is a crucial aspect. This integration parallels
the social HMO for the frail elderly in which integration of longterm care service into acute care is the goal. 8
Two mechanisms encourage this interaction: HMO prepaid
capitation and regulatory provisions. HMOs provide a comprehensive package of services in exchange for a prepaid capitation fee.
Local social service groups, specialized health care providers, and
public health agencies can be cost-effective, accessible, and culturally diverse sources for services. Community organizations and
public agencies assist low-income families in health care through
outreach, social services, and specialized health care services.3 9
Planned Parenthood provides reproductive health services, public
schools provide acute nursing care, and Head Start programs facilitate preventive care.
State Medicaid agency actions can also encourage HMOs to
negotiate arrangements with nontraditional agencies. Certification requirements provide one mechanism for negotiating arrangements. Contracts may require HMOs to list community
agencies that have been considered for subcontracts. If necessary,
the requirements may be more stringent, requiring, in certain
cases, that memoranda of understanding for service provision have
been negotiated.' °
b.

Economic Development

HMO enrollment has an effect on the viability of communities. Medicaid managed care administrators have instituted methods to ensure that the economic well-being of rural and central city
communities is maintained when managed care systems are initiated. Culturally relevant provider requirements, anti-discrimination and affirmative action language in bid specifications, and
protection for community providers assist the maintenance of central city health care providers. 4 ' Rural communities worry about
the loss of accessible health care, the loss of local health care jobs,
See Long-Term Care Lessons, supra note 5, at 3.
supra note 24, at 1-2 (discussing the
changes in the existing HMO program to include "greater emphasis on the coordination and continuity of all services to Medicaid recipients" including services provided
by the community).
40 See CERTIFICATION REVIEW SECTION, supra note 17, at 9; MASSACHUSETTS REQUEST
FOR PROPOSALS, supra note 24, at 2.
41 See Contract, supra note 36, at 13.
38

39 MASSACHUSETTS REQUEST FOR PROPOSALS,
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and the economic viability of the region when managed care is instituted. Differential capitation rates by region, bid specifications
for provider accessibility, and requirements for a ratio of primary
providers to clients are techniques that may be implemented to
maintain health care in rural communities.42
c.

Coalitions and Forums

A community coalition of local groups and concerned individuals can amplify the individual complaint, serve as an independent
information source for clients and community groups, and provide
a base for criticism. A community coalition can organize regular
local meetings with state officials and alternative providers.4" Community-based forums can monitor managed care by providing
places for advocacy groups, clients, community-based organizations, HMOs, and government agencies to coordinate and communicate with each other. HMO contract requirements for outcome
data, access, and cultural sensitivity can encourage HMOs to attend
forums and use them for information gathering and networking.
Community agencies such as Head Start programs, often ignored
by the traditional health care organizations, may find the forums
useful for networking. Advocacy groups can use the forums to
present concerns and gather information. The meetings can also
serve as an opportunity for oversight and review of the health conditions in the community.
III.
A.

EMERGING APPROACH: THE SOCIAL WORKPLACE

HMO

The Actors

Many consumers receive health care coverage through HMO
workplace plans regulated by a hodgepodge of state and federal
agencies.'
Protection systems for consumers enrolled in these
42 In Wisconsin's statewide expansion, there is significant concern about the maintenance of rural providers. See WISCONSIN SUMMARv, supranote 29, at 83, Attachment
4 (listing recommendations made regarding rural health clinics and offering responses and rationales).
43 See THE HEALTHWATcH MODEL-A COMMUNITY-BASED APPROACH TO MoNrroa-

ING MANAGED HEALTH CARE (May 1995) (on file with the author) (examining the

Milwaukee County HealthWatch coalition as a model of how communities may best
respond to ongoing concerns regarding the availability, accessibility, and quality of
health care, and proposing to develop statewide and regional conferences to expand
HealthWatch activities and assist other communities in establishing similar coalitions); see also Trubek, supranote 4, at 293 (discussing the development of the Milwaukee HMO forum).
44 See Geraldine Dallek et al., Consumer Protection in State HMO Laws, CENTER FOR
HEALTH CARE RIGHTS, Nov. 1995, at ix, xi.
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plans are necessary. Inadequate regulation and unavailable information contribute to poor quality care and dissatisfaction with
HMOs.45 Three groups are undertaking the project of including
social protection in HMO systems. The first group, the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), a voluntary organization of state regulators, is proposing model rules and legislation. These uniform HMO regulations require that health care
networks be regulated as insurance and comply with complex
model rules and legislation.46 The NAIC program has no independent authority; proposals must be enacted state by state.
The State of NewJersey, a second entity working toward social
protection, is crafting its own regulations. Len Fishman, New
Jersey Health Commissioner, in conjunction with the Commissioner of Insurance, is developing a comprehensive set of regulations to create an overall framework that includes consumer
protection. These regulations, unlike the NAIC model rules, provide for joint regulation by the Department of Health and the in47
surance regulatory agency.

A third group working toward social protection in HMO systems is the NCQA, an independent, not-for-profit agency.48 NCQA
provides information to purchasers and consumers of managed
health care as part of its mission to improve workplace health insurance by enabling purchasers and consumers to distinguish
among plans based on quality. The NCQA efforts are organized
around HMO accreditation and performance measurement (report cards) used by HMOs for marketing. Regulators are considering incorporating the NCQA products within their mandatory
Id.
The determination that all states regulate HMOs in a uniform manner is important. In California, for example, the HMOs are regulated by the Department of Corporations, a notoriously weak agency. See generally Treat Prmviders Like Insurers, MOD.
HEALTHCARE, Aug. 21, 1995. The proposed NAIC rules are currently in committee
and are going through the approval process. See generally National Association of Insurance Commissioners, Draft, Managed Care Provider Network Adequacy and Contracting Model Act (Dec. 4, 1995) (providing a model version of a health care act
drafted to assure the availability, accessibility, and quality of services under a managed
health care plan, and soliciting comments thereon) [hereinafter NAIC Draft Model
Act].
47 HMO Advisory Committee, State of New Jersey, Draft, Proposed HMO Regulations, NJ. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, § 38 (Nov. 17, 1995) (proposing rules developed by the
New Jersey Commissioner of Health in conjunction with the Commissioner of Insurance to govern the establishment and operation of New Jersey HMOs) [hereinafter
New Jersey Proposed Regulations].
48 NCQA, 2000 L Street, N.W. Suite 500, Washington, D.C. 20036. For more information on the NCQA, NCQA News, accreditation, HEDIS, conferences, and publications, call (202) 955-3500 or fax (202) 955-3599.
45
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system. 49
The NAIC, NewJersey, and NCQA initiatives demonstrate serious efforts to incorporate social protection into workplace health
policies. 50 Each program demonstrates an understanding of the
barriers to adequate health care for low-income families using
HMOs by proposing provisions for enabling and protecting consumers. These ambitious projects stem from two factors: competition among HMOs for workplace customers and proposed changes
in Medicaid and welfare programs.
The competition for customers among HMOs has been based
on price shopping. Few mechanisms provide for quality comparisons to be effectively communicated to customers. Adequate regulation and consumer voice have been absent in the workplace
health insurance system. The employer and employee, therefore,
have few options when dissatisfied by the performance of the servicing HMO except for the option to move to another HMO that
claims to offer a better deal. HMOs offering quality service are also
at a disadvantage: they are undercut by low-cost, low-quality
HMOs. Inadequate information prevents the employer and employee from distinguishing between the good and poor HMO.
Federal initiatives in Medicaid and welfare programs are the
second factor underlying these projects. Proposed welfare reforms
and Medicaid revisions allow us to rethink health care financing
and delivery to low-income families. The welfare reform proposals
place virtually all low-income women in jobs. The availability of
adequate and affordable health care coverage for workers is essential for the success of this new system. If families go without coverage, the charity system will be overburdened, health care indicators
will decline, and workers will be unable to perform.
Medicaid block grant proposals allow funds to be used for people with income up to 300% of the federal poverty level.5 1 The
intent of the expanded eligibility is to create an opportunity to provide health care plans for working people. Legislation in Wisconsin, for example, expands health care coverage to people not
currently eligible for Medicaid benefits by changing income limits
and allowing client contribution.5 2
49 See infra note 70 and accompanying text (discussing the use of NCQA material
in NAIC regulations).
50 See Dallek et al., supra note 44, at xi (noting that there are other projects underway as well).
51 See generallyJane Horvath et al., NATIONAL ACADEMY FOR STATE HEALTH PoLICY,
RESTRUCrURING MEDICAID: OPTIONS AND STRATEGIES FOR STATES (Feb. 1996).
52 See 1995 Act 289.
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Support for enrolling current Medicaid recipients in the workplace system is improved if workplace protections are credible.
HMOs and advocates are reluctant to propose systems that will result in poor quality care and dissatisfied customers. These public
and private initiatives are based on the assumption that credible
workplace HMO health policies are necessary for both an equitable
competitive market and an expansion of workplace coverage. Further, these proposals recognize that credible policies must include
consumer protection and community participation.
B.

The Proposalsfor Consumer Protection and Community
Participationin Workplace HMO Policies

An examination of the documents drafted by the organizations reveals a substantial package of protection, an impressive improvement over current laws and regulations.53 Requirements on
quality assurance, consumer information, and access standards are
the most progressive. Although essential elements of varied complaint mechanisms, effective enforcement, and community involvement require additional implementation, the proposals
demonstrate a willingness to create systems that could enable lowincome families to receive quality care in HMOs.
1.

Complaint Mechanisms

Grievance procedures within the HMO are the preferred
mechanism for expressing client dissatisfaction in the New Jersey
and NAIC regulations. Both sytems create several elaborate levels
of review.54 Although the rules do not provide encouragement for
interactive or informal complaint systems, the NAIC rules indicate
that alternative dispute resolution systems are not prohibited.5 5
Additional complaint systems would create more opportunities for
consumer feedback. Provisions for group advocacy would create
organizations and mechanisms for systemic analysis. 56
Independent ombudsman programs provide advice to clients
on redress, assemble information on systemic problems, and present data and information to decision makers. Funding for such
groups to participate in complaint handling, rulemaking, or policy
See generally Dallek et al., supra note 44.
See NAIC Draft Model Act, supra note 46 (including a "Grievance Procedure
Model Regulation" rule creating an elaborate grievance procedure).
53
54

55

See id.

See Sylvia Law, A Right to Health Care That Cannot Be Taken Away: The Lessons of
Twenty-F've Years of Health Care Advocacy, 61 TENN. L. REv. 771, 779, 791 (1994).
56
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development would be a dramatic step forward. The NAIC and
New Jersey rules could create such ombudsman programs. The
NAIC, in fact, has a funding program for consumer groups who
wish to participate in the NAIC processes. These groups attend
testify at hearings, and develop a consumer
NAIC meetings,
57
agenda.
2.

Consumer Information

NCQA and New Jersey propose different systems to provide
consumer information. NCQA uses a system of accreditation combined with report cards. NCQA relies on a private mechanism
where HMOs apply for certification based on compliance with a set
of indicators. HMOs publicize this information when marketing
their plans. The NCQA provides information on how to choose an
HMO based on these quality indicators and encourages report
cards comparing performance measures. 58 NAIC appears to be re59
lying on the NCQA system for a consumer information system;
however, the rules do provide that HMOs must annually provide
clients with information on the results of their data collection and
quality assessment programs.6
The New Jersey system more closely parallels the Medicaid
model. NAIC rules require a specified benefit package which allows consumers to compare plans, proposes controls on agent marketing, prevents misinformation, and insures an open enrollment
period for consumers to compare plans. 6 1 The New Jersey approach, however, does not encourage institutions or mechanisms
to assist consumers. For example, outreach to consumers who
might not be able to read or understand the informational materials is not required.
57 See Letter from Ellen Wilcox, Associate Counsel, NAIC, to Applicants for NAIC
1994 Consumer Participation Program 1 (Feb. 2, 1994) (on file with the author);
Letter from Mary Griffin, Insurance Counsel, Consumers Union, to Susan Martin,
NAIC 1 (Jan. 11, 1995) (on file with the author); NAIC, 1994 Guidelines for Reimbursement of Expenses for NAIC Funded Consumer Representatives (1994) (on file
with the author); see also Trubek, supra note 4, at 297 (discussing funded consumer
representation models).
58 For more information on NCQA and means of obtaining NCQA materials, see
supra note 48 and accompanying text.
59 See NAIC Draft Model Act, supra note 46, at 4 (suggesting a "Quality Assessment
and Improvement Model Regulation").
60 See id. at 7.
61 See generally New Jersey Proposed Regulations, supra note 47.
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Access Standards

The access requirements in the NewJersey regulations and the
NAIC proposed legislation are impressive.6" Geographic access in
the HMO networks is regulated, including a time in transit standard. Twenty-four hour hotlines are required, appointment waiting times are regulated, and the ratio of primary care physicians to
clients is standardized.6" Moreover, HMOs must maintain plans in
a manner that does not discriminate against certain groups of clients. NAIC proposals also discuss diverse language requirements.
One notable gap is the absence of an outreach requirement for
families that do not utilize services. This requirement is essential
to ensure adequate health care for low-income families. Without
the requirement, an HMO may receive capitation payments with
no obligation to insure that the client is aware of the potential
services.6 4
4.

Governance and Enforcement

The process by which HMOs are held accountable for their
actions includes governance and enforcement systems. In workplace health policies, the employer, client, and regulator can be
involved in both governance and enforcement. In developing
model rules and legislation, the NAIC permitted substantial consumer and HMO comments.' The rulemaking process at the state
level also requires opportunities for participation, and the legislative process allows for public input.
The NewJersey rules require that the HMO provide a "mechanism by which members and providers will be afforded an opportunity to participate in matters of policy and operation through the
establishment of advisory panels, by the use of advisory referendum
on major policy decisions, or through the use of other mechanisms."66 People who wish to participate in this elaborate process
of governance require training and information. The NAIC has initiated such a system; however, most states and HMOs do not provide those opportunities. Employer and client groups may require
62 See id. (listing New Jersey access requirements); NAIC Draft Model Act, supra
note 46 (proposing access requirements).
63 See NAIC Draft Model Act, sura note 46, at 4 (concerning geographic access
regulations).
64 See Philip, supra note 3, at B8.
65 Telephone Interview with Elizabeth Hadley, Associate Counsel, National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) (Feb. 23, 1996).
66 New Jersey Proposed Regulations, supra note 47.
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such assistance if they are to effectively communicate their
concerns.
The HMO system is based on contracts between the provider
and the payor. The administrative rules are interpreted through
contract negotiations and the enforcement system. The NAIC and
New Jersey rules envision an enforcement system based on a triannual certification review, site visits, and financial penalties for regulatory noncompliance. 7 Employers who pay for health care and
consumers who enrolled in the HMOs appear to have no role. 68
Financial incentives for compliance could be provided. The rules
could provide for the remedy of recoupment of employer payments if the regulatory provisions are violated by the HMO. If the
HMO fails to deliver the required service, such as the required ratio of primary care providers to consumers, the employer could
obtain a refund for the inadequate service. Consumer-based remedies such as consumer class actions and reimbursement for lowquality care could be incorporated in the rules and statutes. A
wide variety of enforcement tools are essential for compliance.
5.

Quality Assurance

All three initiatives use quality assurance systems. The NCQA
procedures are "works in progress" overseen by a diverse group
that includes employers, consumer and labor representatives,
health providers, quality experts, regulators, and representatives
from organized medicine. The NCQA system serves as the basis for
the NAIC and New Jersey rules. The elaborate data requirements
for the HMOs, including the use of filed grievances and the continuous quality measures, are useful mechanisms for quality health
care.6 9 The NAIC proposed regulations for specific data collection
for specific groups is commendable. Low-income families benefit
from indicators, for example, that reveal perinatal service provision
70
and immunization rates.
6.

Community Participation

There is scarcely any indication of the importance of health
care facilities and personnel to the well-being of communities.
67
68

Id.; NAIC Draft Model Act, supra note 46.
In many health plans, the consumers also contribute to the payment for health

care.
69 See NAIC Utilization Review Model Act, Draft of April 3, 1996 and Proposed
New Jersey Regulations subchapter 7.
70 See NAIC Draft Model Act, supra note 46 (including a "Quality Assessment and
Improvement Model Regulation").
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There are few regulations or incentives for use of minority providers, maintenance of rural facilities, or community organizations.
The exception is the NAIC requirement of integrating public
health into the HMO system. The legislative proposal requires that
HMOs must provide a "description of the... strategy for integra71
tion of public health goals with the health services offered."
Schools, social service agencies, and community-based providers
can also be effective providers. The only assistance for these organizations is the NAIC provision that health carriers are required to
make available to anyone their general requirements for selection
and retention.72
The three initiatives do not discuss the community forums that
have been so significant in the Medicaid HMO system. The forums
allow HMOs, regulators, payers, consumer and community groups
and government administrators to gather and discuss specific
problems in HMO delivery as well as plan for the overall health of
their community, creating a nonadversarial, exploratory site for information sharing, networking, and planning. 7 States could encourage the development of forums by requiring HMOs to
participate, funding groups that wish to organize or attend the
meetings, or hosting the forums themselves.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The convergence of social aspects in workplace and Medicaid
systems allows one to be optimistic about improved health care coverage for low-income families. The Medicaid model demonstrates
unexpected responsiveness by regulators, HMO administrators,
and consumer and community groups. Workplace regulators and
private certifiers are initiating systems that recognize the importance of consumer and community participation in the provision
of quality HMO health care to working families. Finally, the Medicaid experience indicates that HMOs will enroll low-income persons when a supportive, reasonable system is offered.
The presence of the social HMO in both the workplace and
Medicaid systems encourages consideration of a single system.
Medicaid managed care has a history that can be studied, evaluated
and improved. The newly-issued NAIC and New Jersey regulations
demonstrate that workplace policies can include social protection
to provide adequate health care coverage for low-income families.
NAIC Draft Model Act, supra note 46, at 6.
See id. at 12.
73 See Trubek, supra note 4, at 293 (discussing community forums).
71
72
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Proposals for a single,. health care system for low-income families
should be considered. A seamless system would permit employed
and unemployed people to maintain coverage in an HMO.74
There are two approaches to blending the workplace and
Medicaid systems: merging Medicaid into workplace policies (the
workplace approach) and allowing low-income working families
into the Medicaid system (the Medicaid approach). Under the
workplace approach, all policies would be monitored by a single
agency. Low-income employees would be subsidized with Medicaid
dollars.75 Under the Medicaid approach, low-income families
would be offered a well-developed social framework for health care
delivery. The Medicaid system offers a comprehensive health care
package to all consumers with experienced oversight, redress, and
enforcement.7" Eligibility would be expanded to more low-income
workers using Medicaid HMO dollars and regulation.
Both the workplace and Medicaid approaches are on the table, and a period of experimentation is likely and acceptable."
Providing quality care, community health, and a profit for providers is a major task for an HMO system that serves low-income families. Success in either system can be achieved only when regulation
and oversight are combined with client voice, community participation, and sufficient funding.

74 See Law, supra note 56, at 772 (arguing that a single health care system for all
people is crucial for low-income people).
75 An early version of the Wisconsin welfare reform proposal suggested using
Medicaid dollars to finance up to 80% of the private health care policy for low-income
workers.
76 Barbara L. Wolfe, Reform of Health Carefor the Nonelderly Poor, in CONFRONTING
POVERTY (Sheldon Danziger et al. eds., 1994) (preferring a Medicaid-based model).
77 See generally RESTRUCTURING MEDICAID, supra note 51.

